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2ND NATIONAL ELECTORAL REFORM SUMMIT
Election Administration and Election-Related Constitutional Reforms
Christian S. Monsod, former Comelec chairman
I.
Some Constitutional Provisions Affecting Elections and Electoral Reform
(1) Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them (Art. II, Sec. 1)
(2) Social Justice as the heart of the new constitution
"….in all phases of national development (Art. II, Sec. 10)
"… measures to…."reduce social, economic and political inequalities
and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good." (Art. XIII, Sec. 1)
(3) no religious test for the exercise of civil and political
rights (Art. II, Sec. 5
(4) "…and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
(Art. II, Sec. 26)
(5) absentee voting (Art. V, Sec. 2)
(6) free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve.. (Art.
IX-C, Sec. 6)
(7) sectoral representation in legislative bodies of local government
(Art. X, Sec. 9)
II. Observations on the Conduct and Results of the 2004
Elections
Elections consists of both process and results. The process refers
to the procedures and the environment (such as the peace and order
situation) and can be credible, tolerable, questionable or non-credible.
The results similarly can be credible, tolerable, questionable or
non-credible. There can be a questionable process with credible
results, as there can be a credible process with questionable results.
As a process, the 2004 elections was tolerable, with the competence
of the Commission as the main issue:
- i.
starting with the appointment of two new commissioners with questionable
credentials;
- ii.
wrong priorities of the Commission itself i.e. an electronic transmission
project that the Comelec promised not to implement, finally stopped
by the Supreme Court on which P400 million was spent;
- iii.
high cost-low relevance projects, i.e. a voter validation project
that did not issue a single ID costing about P1 billion;
- iv.
an automation contract also struck down by the Supreme Court;
- v.
indecisiveness on key issues;
- vi.
perceived blundering or misleading responses to public questions,
i.e. availability of voters lists etc.).
Corruption
at the highest levels of the Comelec and partisanship for a sitting
President were the other issues. The Commission has a credibility
problem of its own making. It did not even command the respect of
candidates sufficiently to conduct presidential debates. And the violence
and casualty rates were too high to ascribe to local rivalries.
Moreover, the prolonged and badly managed canvassing in Congress,
with the sidelight of a Supreme Court case, did much to also hurt
the credibility of the process. And NAMFREL, perhaps for the first
time in its existence, perceived as not being totally transparent
or decisive, lost some ground in credibility as well. But, fortunately,
the Comelec is more than the commissioners and elections is more
than the Comelec. Virtually every sector in society has a hand in
a credible elections.
But the key element that saved the 2004 process from being a disaster
was the professionalism of the Comelec career officers (as exemplified
by the composed performance of Betty Pizana before Congress) and,
above all, the election officials at the ground level, both Comelec
and its deputies. The vast majority of them did their job well,
despite the unnecessary burden of poor leadership.
Because credible elections are delivered in the field, and not
at the Comelec Head Office, the results were largely credible across
some 17,000 elected officials. With respect to the results of the
Presidential elections, it can also be defined as tolerable, if
not acceptable, not because it was decisive but because the main
opposition candidate self-destructed, and people wanted to get on
with their lives.
Regardless of conventional thought to the contrary, Filipinos do
cast an intelligent vote and the 2004 elections can be considered
in the same light, even if, for some, it was a matter of lesser
cost rather than better benefits. This was the conclusion of the
Comelec in 1992, which was recently validated in focus group studies
by Ateneo University. Even the vote for Estrada in 1998 can be considered
an intelligent vote. It was the first time there was a class vote
and, frankly, it may have been overdue. That Estrada turned out
not to have served the interests of the poor does not change the
quality of the vote.
The margin of victory of GMA was probably closer to 1%; there are
just too many reports of cheating to be ignored, mainly in Mindanao,
with Comelec high officials probably interfering with the process.
This may have been driven by what the administration thought was
necessary for a so-called "clear mandate."
Having said that, I don't see any basis for the allegation that
there was a massive conspiracy to cheat involving government, Comelec,
NAMFREL, media etc. And disenfranchisement was not a premeditated
and systematic attempt to reduce opposition votes. It was more the
result of incompetence at Comelec Central, at the commissioner level.
As expected, but nonetheless regrettable, the opposition did not
really have the machinery to protect their vote. Alleging massive
fraud is a poor substitute for hard evidence.
If one were to juxtapose the 2004 elections with past elections,
what comes to mind are two elections, with Marcos as a common personality.
Before martial law, except for Marcos in 1969, all previous incumbent
presidents lost in the quest for another term (Osmena, Quirino,
Garcia, Macapagal). And to stay in power, Marcos raided the national
treasury in what may be the dirtiest elections in our history. After
1986, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the only incumbent president running
for election, by operation of the constitution.
1986 was also the only other time that Comelec tried to centralize
the voters' lists and to conduct its own quick count. Both projects
failed miserably in their objectives. Massive disenfranchisement
did not deter people from guarding the vote and the Comelec quick
count was so blatant an attempt at manipulating the results that
it caused a walkout of programmers and lost the credibility battle
with NAMFREL.
There are lessons to be learned from all the above that should
not be lost in planning ahead. But despite all, I believe that we,
as a people, did prove something in 2004 - that even when our democracy
is not in its best behavior, it works. This is not to condone irregularities
and incompetence, but to remind you that there is hope.
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