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2ND NATIONAL ELECTORAL REFORM SUMMIT
Election Administration and Election-Related Constitutional Reforms
Christian S. Monsod, former Comelec chairman

I. Some Constitutional Provisions Affecting Elections and Electoral Reform

    (1) Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them (Art. II, Sec. 1)

    (2) Social Justice as the heart of the new constitution

    "….in all phases of national development (Art. II, Sec. 10)

    "… measures to…."reduce social, economic and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." (Art. XIII, Sec. 1)

    (3) no religious test for the exercise of civil and political rights (Art. II, Sec. 5

    (4) "…and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." (Art. II, Sec. 26)

    (5) absentee voting (Art. V, Sec. 2)

    (6) free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve.. (Art. IX-C, Sec. 6)

    (7) sectoral representation in legislative bodies of local government (Art. X, Sec. 9)

II. Observations on the Conduct and Results of the 2004 Elections

Elections consists of both process and results. The process refers to the procedures and the environment (such as the peace and order situation) and can be credible, tolerable, questionable or non-credible. The results similarly can be credible, tolerable, questionable or non-credible. There can be a questionable process with credible results, as there can be a credible process with questionable results. As a process, the 2004 elections was tolerable, with the competence of the Commission as the main issue:

  • i. starting with the appointment of two new commissioners with questionable credentials;
  • ii. wrong priorities of the Commission itself i.e. an electronic transmission project that the Comelec promised not to implement, finally stopped by the Supreme Court on which P400 million was spent;
  • iii. high cost-low relevance projects, i.e. a voter validation project that did not issue a single ID costing about P1 billion;
  • iv. an automation contract also struck down by the Supreme Court;
  • v. indecisiveness on key issues;
  • vi. perceived blundering or misleading responses to public questions, i.e. availability of voters lists etc.).

Corruption at the highest levels of the Comelec and partisanship for a sitting President were the other issues. The Commission has a credibility problem of its own making. It did not even command the respect of candidates sufficiently to conduct presidential debates. And the violence and casualty rates were too high to ascribe to local rivalries.

Moreover, the prolonged and badly managed canvassing in Congress, with the sidelight of a Supreme Court case, did much to also hurt the credibility of the process. And NAMFREL, perhaps for the first time in its existence, perceived as not being totally transparent or decisive, lost some ground in credibility as well. But, fortunately, the Comelec is more than the commissioners and elections is more than the Comelec. Virtually every sector in society has a hand in a credible elections.

But the key element that saved the 2004 process from being a disaster was the professionalism of the Comelec career officers (as exemplified by the composed performance of Betty Pizana before Congress) and, above all, the election officials at the ground level, both Comelec and its deputies. The vast majority of them did their job well, despite the unnecessary burden of poor leadership.

Because credible elections are delivered in the field, and not at the Comelec Head Office, the results were largely credible across some 17,000 elected officials. With respect to the results of the Presidential elections, it can also be defined as tolerable, if not acceptable, not because it was decisive but because the main opposition candidate self-destructed, and people wanted to get on with their lives.

Regardless of conventional thought to the contrary, Filipinos do cast an intelligent vote and the 2004 elections can be considered in the same light, even if, for some, it was a matter of lesser cost rather than better benefits. This was the conclusion of the Comelec in 1992, which was recently validated in focus group studies by Ateneo University. Even the vote for Estrada in 1998 can be considered an intelligent vote. It was the first time there was a class vote and, frankly, it may have been overdue. That Estrada turned out not to have served the interests of the poor does not change the quality of the vote.

The margin of victory of GMA was probably closer to 1%; there are just too many reports of cheating to be ignored, mainly in Mindanao, with Comelec high officials probably interfering with the process. This may have been driven by what the administration thought was necessary for a so-called "clear mandate."

Having said that, I don't see any basis for the allegation that there was a massive conspiracy to cheat involving government, Comelec, NAMFREL, media etc. And disenfranchisement was not a premeditated and systematic attempt to reduce opposition votes. It was more the result of incompetence at Comelec Central, at the commissioner level.

As expected, but nonetheless regrettable, the opposition did not really have the machinery to protect their vote. Alleging massive fraud is a poor substitute for hard evidence.

If one were to juxtapose the 2004 elections with past elections, what comes to mind are two elections, with Marcos as a common personality. Before martial law, except for Marcos in 1969, all previous incumbent presidents lost in the quest for another term (Osmena, Quirino, Garcia, Macapagal). And to stay in power, Marcos raided the national treasury in what may be the dirtiest elections in our history. After 1986, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the only incumbent president running for election, by operation of the constitution.

1986 was also the only other time that Comelec tried to centralize the voters' lists and to conduct its own quick count. Both projects failed miserably in their objectives. Massive disenfranchisement did not deter people from guarding the vote and the Comelec quick count was so blatant an attempt at manipulating the results that it caused a walkout of programmers and lost the credibility battle with NAMFREL.

There are lessons to be learned from all the above that should not be lost in planning ahead. But despite all, I believe that we, as a people, did prove something in 2004 - that even when our democracy is not in its best behavior, it works. This is not to condone irregularities and incompetence, but to remind you that there is hope.

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