a.
The Commission has looked at these grievances and found some are not
without foundation. Nevertheless, it appears that the real impetus
for the rebellion, the operative goal of the Magdalo group, was to
seize power by force and implement Honasan’s NRP.
b. The goal and the plotting and the willingness to use armed violence
to secure political changes and thereby, hopefully, correct the
grievances proclaimed appear to reflect a certain psychological
basis which, in the Final Report (1990) of the Davide Commission,
was described as a “Messianic complex”. (1) There is the idealism
taught at the PMA which is later challenged by the realities of
combat duty and life in the real world. This creates a powerful
emotive force that when combined with the issue of graft and corruption
and the poor conditions in the field, could make soldiers vulnerable
to recruitment by both military and civilian coup plotters.
c. This, however, does not diminish the reality and legitimacy of their
grievances, with respect to, for instance, the RSBS, the Modernization Fund, and a few
other cases discussed in detail in Part II of this report.
d. Moreover, the military’ s rigid hierarchy, subordination to seniors, and
strict culture of obedience make the grievance mechanisms such as the Inspector General
Armed Forces of the Philippines (IG) and the Office of Ethical Standards and Public
Accountability (OESPA) ineffective. (2)
4. The Negotiated Return to Barracks
a. Many groups persuaded the rebels to return to barracks, including their
classmates from the PMA and military officers the rebels trusted such as Lim, Oban,
Domingo, and Danga. Two groups of negotiators were apparently cleared to negotiate
with the rebels by Secretary Romulo. The first consisted of Biazon, Honasan, Sotto,
Defensor, and Velasco who apparently obtained authorization from the Executive
Secretary at various times and through various means. The second was led by Cimatu
who, after obtaining the acceptance by the rebels as the principal Government negotiator
eventually succeeded in concluding the return to barracks agreement.
b. Varying accounts of the details of the discussions with the rebels could be
due to the large number of people present at different stages of the process, their location
relative to the scene of the negotiations as well as to the participants, the variety of
personal and positional interests they represented, and the environment of tension and
crisis.
c. Not having a more clearly defined mandate other than to end the incident
as soon as possible and without bloodshed and damage to property, a military framework
defined the terms of the agreement, i.e., that the core group would bear full responsibility
for the incident under military law while the followers would be processed according to
the Articles of War. The discussions between the Government group led by Cimatu and
the Magdalo group is also a classic case of “mutual ignorance” of the applicable laws,
neither side being aware of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes coup
d’ etat. This is a disturbing revelation. Neither, it also appears, was there anyone with a
working knowledge of what Article 105 of the Articles of War actually provides.
d. Some have alleged that differences in the interpretation of the terms of the
return to barracks agreement by the rebels, by the negotiators, and by the civilian
prosecutorial agencies of the Government may have created a perception that the rebel
officers were “betrayed” by the filing of charges in civilian courts. Assuming this
sentiment exists and if it becomes widely shared by officers in the AFP, it could become
a tool of recruitment and tend to discourage future negotiations with the Government in a
similar situation.
5. Other Findings
a. Search and Recovery of Materials Left by Rebels
(1) Materials, including documents left by the rebels in Oakwood and in the
vehicles recovered in Naval Base Cavite indicated some civilian support, in cash and in
kind, had been extended to the rebels. Communications equipment left at Oakwood,
vehicles, uniforms, flags, arm bands, backpacks, and other paraphernalia obviously cost a
substantial amount of money. The use as staging points of two houses owned by persons
close to former President Estrada described above tends to reinforce the belief that some
support from certain civilian sectors had been provided.
(2) There is reasonable basis to believe that the documents and diskettes
recovered by Government authorities were not merely fabricated and planted by military
authorities. Testimonies regarding the details of the process of recovery and the places
where they were recovered tended to be, in part, inconsistent with each other. This is
due perhaps to the haste with which the Oakwood management sought to clear the
premises, the different views held by the Oakwood management, and the ISAFP
operatives on what “valuable” means, as well as the ISAFP officers’ desire immediately
to recover whatever materials might have intelligence value.
(3) Authorities that came to investigate and gather evidence regarding the
incident appeared less than careful in the observance of standard evidence-collection
procedures.
b. Root Causes
(1) The politicization of the military amid the erosion of civilian
political institutions that had oversight powers over the military,
particularly during and since the imposition of martial law, is
a cause of military adventurism. The AFP’s role as a partner in
national development efforts led them to assume roles that used
to be played by civilian authorities. This tended to increase their
political leverage over other sectors of society, and contributed
to their politicization as they interfaced directly with the people
and the problems of the country. During the martial law period,
there were no institutional checks on the military’s power and
influence as well as on the uses to which its power was used, other
than the personal power of President Marcos.
1 The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission
(pursuant to R.A. No. 6832), Chapter III, Sections A and B, and
Chapter VII, Section A, October 1990.
2 See below, “ The AFP Grievance Mechanism: The
Limitations of Internal Controls” , Part Two, II-D.
