(2) Failure on the part of the Government to enforce the law deprives the law
of its power to deter, particularly among those who had engaged in previous coup plots
against the Government but who were granted unconditional amnesty in 1995 without
prior punishment. A number of former coup plotters who had been punished for their
participation in the coup attempts of the 1980s and returned to the military after the 1995
grant of unconditional amnesty, have turned their back on military adventurism.
Members of their units did not join the Magdalo group in Oakwood. But some of those
who received unconditional amnesty without prior punishment were in the list of
members of the NRP Council. This suggests that consistent enforcement of the law may
be a critical factor in neutralizing the coup virus.
(3) The key role of the AFP in the campaigns against communist insurgency
and Moro secessionism creates civilian Government dependence upon the military. In
addition to the clearing of areas of insurgents and defending such cleared areas, soldiers
are required to discharge the tasks of consolidation and development that properly belong
to civilian authorities. (3) Not only is the military’ s political power enhanced, but their
politicization is also thereby increased as they confront the problems of these
communities on a prolonged basis.
(4) Enlistment by civilian persons, including politicians, of military support
for their personal and political ambitions contributes to military politicization and
adventurism. Former President Marcos (and not the AFP) initiated the enlargement of
the role of the military during his incumbency, particularly during martial law. Civilian persons, including politicians, also sought and encouraged the military breakaway of
February 1986 and January 2001, giving thereby the AFP great political leverage over the
civilian leaders who appear to rely on the military for political survival. When
adequately motivated, military adventurers could exploit this situation to destabilize and
overthrow the Government.
(5) At the same time, officers and troops under diligent and respected
commanding officers did not join in the 27 July mutiny, suggesting the critical role
played by this breed of military leaders in dealing with the coup virus.
c. Provocations
(1) Grievances about graft and corruption in the military, such as the RSBS,
the Modernization Fund, and the procurement system provide a fertile ground for the
recruitment of officers and men for military intervention and even the overthrow of
Government. The expression of grievances resonates to the wider polity who share these
sentiments, even as they do not approve of the means used and the solution proffered by
the Magdalo group.
(2) The Commission believes that the discovery or disclosure of the plot led
the rebels prematurely to launch “Oplan Andres” , a plot larger than the Oakwood
incident. Failure to attain the force requirements of Plans Alpha and Bravo compelled
the rebels to launch Plan Charlie.
(3) Moreover, members of PMA ’ 94 and ’ 95 were “ frustrated” when the
dialogue about their concerns they expected would take place during the dinner hosted by
the President on 23 July, did not take place. PMA ’ 94 and ’ 95 had the opportunity to talk
to Abaya at the “White House”. (4) They talked about their class being unjustly linked to a plot against the Government as well as about their commitment to fight graft and
corruption ever since their graduation from the Academy. When the dinner with the
President arranged for 23 July did not include a dialogue about their concerns, the
invitees went down “ frustrated.”
(4) Finally, the order by the President aired on national television for the
arrest of the coup leaders as “ rogue soldiers” was a precipitating factor behind the
Oakwood incident. At the time of the President’ s order, the leaders of the plot were
already missing from their respective units.
II. Recommendations of the Commission Concerning the Events of 27 July 2003
at Oakwood.
1. Due diligence by commanding officers - Commanding officers in the field
need constantly to warn their men against recruitment for destabilization plots against the
Government by adventurers in the military. Former military rebels who have turned
their back on military adventurism could be used to conduct regular dialogues within the
AFP for this purpose. The adoption of a program of this nature should go a long way
towards neutralizing the coup virus.
2. Effectively address legitimate grievances - The Government and the AFP
need to address the legitimate grievances of the military against corrupt officers, officials,
bureaucrats, and practices. More specific recommendations on this matter are made in
Part Two of this report.
3. A civilian Secretary of National Defense – This Commission reiterates the
recommendation of the Davide Commission to have a civilian appointed to the position
of Secretary of National Defense. (5) Beyond the need to institutionalize the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, the appointment of persons who have not had long
and deep ties to the military, and who have not held positions in the military
establishment that itself needs to be reformed, is essential if a reform program is to
succeed. Although military officers acquire a civilian status upon retirement, they are
likely to bring the rigidity of hierarchy, seniority, camaraderie, and other aspects of the
military culture into the office of the SND that would obstruct reform.
4. Return NICA to its original mandate – Likewise, echoing the Davide
Commission recommendation, this Commission recommends the appointment of a
civilian head for the NICA. Moreover, NICA should be returned to its original mandate,
that is, to coordinate all intelligence agencies, military and otherwise. The President
must have a source of intelligence additional to the ISAFP. (6) This should provide the
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) with a parallel intelligence source in the event that
information gathered by ISAFP is not made fully available to the C-in-C, for any reason
whatsoever.
3 Army Col. Noel Buan, at the Dialogue between the
Commission and the First Scout Ranger Batallion, Isabela City, Basilan,
19 September 2003.
4 This is in reference to the residential quarters
of the AFP chief of staff in Camp Aguinaldo
5 The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission
(pursuant to R.A. No. 6832), recommendation C.2.f., pp. 524-525.
6 The Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant
to R.A. No. 6832), recommendation C.2.f., pp. 524-525.
